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Abstract 
Purpose: Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are the two dominant institutional logics of corporate 
governance in Anglo-Saxon countries (Lok, 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Corporate Logic 
portrays executives as trustworthy professionals that will voluntarily act in the best interests of 
shareholders.  On the other hand, Investor Logic portrays executives as self-interested agents, who 
are capable of maximising shareholder value, but only if incentives schemes are used to align their 
interests with those of shareholders.  Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have opposing 
implications for executive remuneration.   However, prior research has only studied a few aspects of 
executive remuneration (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  This research examines executive 
remuneration, in a holistic manner, in order to determine the extent to which Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are embedded in corporate governance codes and corporate annual reports.  
 
Approach: Drawing on interpretive structuralism (Phillips and Hardy, 2002), a discourse analysis is 
used to deconstruct and elucidate the discourse on executive remuneration that is embedded in 
codes and corporate annual reports.  The sample includes 55 codes and 75 annual reports produced 
between 1991 and 2010 in the UK, Australia (AU) and New Zealand (NZ).  Multiple features of the 
texts are examined to ascertain how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the 
discourse.  These features included 6 remuneration principles and 8 (broad) remuneration practices. 
 
Findings: Code issuers and companies draw on multiple remuneration principles to justify their 
remuneration practices, and these principles and practices are consistent with both Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, the human resources and market principles 
are tied to base salaries and recruitment and retention schemes.  Consistent with Investor Logic, the 
agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles are tied to short- and long-term incentive 
schemes.  As a set, these principles and practices represent what is deemed legitimate and rational, 
despite Corporate Logic and Investor Logic being theoretically incompatible.  By drawing on both 
Logics, code issuers and companies are afforded much flexibility; that is, the prevailing institutional 
logics enable, rather than constrain, their discourse. 
 
Theoretical implications: Unlike prior research, this research recognises that the discourse on 
executive remuneration is highly nuanced and cannot be easily understood through a reductionist 
content analysis.  While Zajac and Westphal (2004) evidenced a transition from Corporate Logic to 
Investor Logic, this research’s discourse analysis shows that both Logics coexist, as distinct from 
compete, in the discourse on executive remuneration.      
 
Practical implications: As both Logics coexist in the discourse, producers (e.g. code issuers and 
companies) and consumers (e.g. investors) of the discourse have to cope with much ambiguity and 
tension inherent in the remuneration principles and practices that constitute the standard 
remuneration package for executives.  For companies, this means their executive remuneration 
practices cannot be easily challenged and their legitimacy can be maintained through the symbolic 
use of remuneration principles and practices.  To enhance accountability, code issuers, investors and 
others should exert pressure on companies to simplify their executive remuneration practices and 
disclosure. 
Institutional Logics Perspective on Executive Remuneration 
Page 2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
How do chief executives officers and their direct reports (hereinafter, executives) behave if they 
receive mainly fixed or variable (performance-based) remuneration?  Agency theorists argue that if 
executives receive mainly fixed remuneration, they will aim to increase firm size and decrease firm 
risk in order to increase and protect their salaries; whereas if executives receive mainly variable 
remuneration, they will optimise firm size and risk in order to maximise their own wealth and, 
consequently, shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
Executives are portrayed as agents who are capable of maximising shareholder value, but only if the 
short- and long-term incentive schemes are designed in such a way as to align their interests with 
those of shareholders.  This set of beliefs is known as Investor Logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).
1
  
Stewardship theorists argue that irrespective of whether executives receive mainly fixed or variable 
remuneration, they will act in the best interests of shareholders (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 
1990).  Executives are portrayed as stewards who are motivated by intrinsic rewards and a sense of 
sentiment and duty.  This set of beliefs is known as Corporate Logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 
The present study investigates how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have shaped the discourse 
on executive remuneration in Australia (AU), New Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK).  
Several aspects of the discourse on executive remuneration are studied.  Most prior research on 
executive remuneration has a positivist methodology and uses quantitative methods to examine the 
relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance (for reviews, see Devers et al., 
2007; Gerhart et al., 2009).  This research differs as an interpretive methodology is adopted and 
qualitative methods are used to deconstruct and make sense of the discourse on executive 
remuneration.  Extending the research of Point and Tyson (2006), Wade et al. (1997) and Zajac and 
Westphal (1995), discourse analysis are used to study how institutional pressures in the form of 
corporate governance codes of practice (hereinafter, codes) influence how remuneration decisions 
are reported in corporate annual reports.  Further, the present study investigates how both Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic, which have opposing implications for executive remuneration, are able to 
co-exist in the discourse.  
 
The paper is organised as follows.  The literature is reviewed in Section 2.  Particular attention is 
given to the theoretical implications of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic for a range of 
remuneration principles and practices.  The research question and method are discussed in Section 
                                                 
1
 Zajac and Westphal (2004) used the term Agency Logic, rather than Investor Logic.  However, the term Investor 
Logic is used in order to distinguish agency theory from Investor Logic. 
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3.  Details of discourse analysis as a method, the sample of texts, and data collection and analysis 
are given.  The findings of the discourse analysis of remuneration principles and practices are 
presented in Section 4.  The findings are then discussed and contextualised in Section 5.  
Concluding comments are made in Section 6.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The present study investigates how institutional logics are embedded in discourse on executive 
remuneration and how institutional logics influence how remuneration decisions are made and 
interpreted.  Essentially, it is recognised that institutional logics have the power to influence 
individual and organisational behaviour (Alford and Friedland, 1985; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
There have been few studies that have taken this approach (cf. Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Here, 
prior research is reinterpreted in order to understand how institutional logics influence how 
companies make and justify executive remuneration decisions.  However, this is problematic 
because institutional logics are ambiguous and flexible.  For example, Investor Logic does not 
prescribe what proportion of executive remuneration should be contingent on firm performance or 
how firm performance should be measured.  Therefore, in reviewing prior research, particularly 
attention is given to the discourse of the researchers and their subjects (e.g. directors) because their 
beliefs influence how they interpret their social realities.   
 
2.1. Institutional Theory and the Institutional Logics Perspective 
Institutional theory is concerned with institutions and institutional logics (for reviews, see Scott, 
2008; and Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  Institutions are processes, practices and structures that are 
self-sustaining and supported by regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements.  
Institutional logics are sets of beliefs, ideas, norms, rules and values that give meaning to 
institutions.  Empirical evidence supports the notion that institutions and institutional logics 
materially influence how corporate governance is conceptualised and practiced (for a review, see 
Fiss, 2008).  An example of an institution is the set of executive remuneration practices within any 
given country because these practices are often standardised (Murphy, 1999; Sanchez Marin, 2008) 
and supported by laws, codes, directors’ networks and remuneration consultants (Conyon et al., 
2011).  Further, an example of an institutional logic is agency theory-based justifications of 
executive remuneration practices, which are widely diffused and have been found to positively 
influence investors’ reactions to the adoption of long-term incentive plans by US companies 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 1995, 2004).   
 
Institutional Logics Perspective on Executive Remuneration 
Page 4 
 
Institutional theory has traditionally explained why organisations within an organisational field 
become homogenous over time (Scott, 2008).  Weber (1968) posited that the desire for profits and 
market forces drive companies to find and adopt the most efficient and rational way of organising.  
This process is known as competitive isomorphism.  On the other hand, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) argued that coercive, normative and mimetic pressures compel companies to adopt similar 
structures and processes that do not necessarily increase efficiency.  Coercive pressure refers to 
companies complying with rules and laws, and being sanctioned for non-compliance.  Normative 
pressure refers to companies enacting norms, standards and values because their members are also 
members of trade and professional associations (e.g. directors’ associations have codes of ethics 
that members are expected to follow).  Mimetic pressure refers to the tendency of companies to 
mimic the actions of their competitors, particularly when faced with uncertainty.  These processes 
are known as institutional isomorphism.  Thus, competitive and institutional isomorphism acts as an 
iron cage that constrains organisational behaviour. 
 
Institutional logics of corporate governance are assumptions and beliefs about how corporate 
governance should be practiced, which are “linked to higher-order societal logics of economic 
activity” (Zajac and Westphal, 2004, p.435).  There is a small but growing body of research on 
institutional logics of corporate governance (e.g. du Plessis, 2008; Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010; 
Shipilov et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  This research is closely tied to research on 
comparative corporate governance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, 2010) and varieties of capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001).  Collectively, prior research has identified a number of institutional logics 
and these have been matched to specific countries.  Typically, researchers have argued that investor 
capitalism (or Investor Logic) is dominant in Anglo-American countries, while network capitalism 
(or Stakeholder Logic) is dominant in Asian and European countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, 
2010).
2
  However, researchers have also pointed out that the dominant institutional logic can change 
over time (Zajac and Westphal, 2004) and while an institutional logic may be dominant in an 
organisational field, other institutional logics can still be active (Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010). 
 
2.2. Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
Table 1 outlines the differences between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Zajac and 
Westphal’s (2004) definitions of both Logics are reiterated and then extended.  Corporate Logic is 
part of the Mega Discourse on managerial capitalism, where the economy is dominated by mega 
corporations that are controlled by specialist executives.  Stewardship theory portrays executives as 
                                                 
2
 Differing from Corporate Logic, Stakeholder Logic assumes that the board will govern the company in the interests of 
all legitimate stakeholders, not just shareholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Preston, 1998). 
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motivated by intrinsic rewards and willing to act in the shareholders’ best interests without the need 
for coercion (Davis, et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990).  They are not driven to maximise their own 
wealth, but they are driven to maximise shareholder value, which will result in economic efficiency 
and growth (Englander and Kaufman, 2004; Kaen et al., 1988).  On the other hand, Investor Logic 
is part of the Mega Discourse on investor capitalism, where competitive markets hold corporations 
and their generalist executives to account, which will also result in economic efficiency and growth 
(Ghoshal, 2005; Kaen et al., 1988).  Agency theory portrays executives as motivated by extrinsic 
(monetary) rewards and opportunistic (Davis et al., 1997; Ghoshal, 2005).  While capable of 
maximising shareholder value, they will only do so if short- and long-term incentive schemes are 
designed appropriately (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
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Table 1: Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
Key Facets Corporate Logic
1
 Investor Logic
1
 
Links to Mega 
Discourses (or 
higher-order 
cultural frames) 
- Managerial capitalism: top management 
have primary responsibility for 
allocating resources to different 
businesses in the corporation 
- Norms of professional autonomy 
- Investor capitalism: shareholders can 
diversify better and more easily than 
firms 
 
- Logic of capitalist markets 
Links to theories 
of organisation 
- Managerialist theory (Chandler, 1962) 
- Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson, 1990) 
- Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 
1976) 
Corporate 
objective 
- Shareholder value maximisation 
(Donaldson, 1990; Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004) 
- Shareholder value maximisation 
(Jensen, 2001; Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004) 
Behavioural 
model of 
executives 
- Professionals with unique strategic 
knowledge that is required for efficient 
allocation of corporate resources  
- Stewards of their organisations 
 
- Executives are motivated by intrinsic 
rewards (Davis et al., 1997; Frey and 
Osterloh, 2005) 
- Relatively fungible agents of 
shareholders 
 
- Pursue strategies that advance personal 
interests at expense of shareholders 
- Executives are motivated by extrinsic 
rewards (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990) 
Remuneration 
philosophy 
- Use salary and other rewards to attract 
and retain scarce managerial talent 
- “Fixed Pay: Recruit good people  
Pay them well  Expect good 
performance” (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2007, p.524) 
- Use incentives to align management 
and shareholder interests 
- “Performance-Based Pay: Recruit 
good people  Expect good 
performance  Pay them well if 
performance is actually good” 
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007, 
p.524) 
Remuneration 
principles 
- Fairness: Vertical equity between 
executives and employees 
- Human resources: Remuneration  
tailored to executives’ preferences 
- Market: Horizontal equity between 
executives in similar roles, i.e. 
executives are paid comparably to their 
peers 
- Agency: Use incentives to align 
executives’ interests with those of 
shareholders 
- Motivation: Use monetary incentives to 
motivate executives 
- Pay-for-performance: Executives paid 
well only if firm performance meets or 
exceeds expectations 
Remuneration 
practices 
- Performance measures: Internal; 
financial and non-financial 
 
- Desired mix: Mainly fixed remuneration 
 
- Level: Positioned at the median relative 
to other executives in similar roles, 
although the level may be constrained 
by the rate of change in employees’ 
salaries and wages. 
- Performance measures: External, e.g. 
Economic Value Added
TM
 and total 
shareholder return 
- Desired mix: Mainly variable 
remuneration 
- Level: Positioning depends on firm 
performance (e.g. high relative firm 
performance will mean that executives 
are paid at the upper quartile relative 
to other executives in similar roles) 
Remuneration 
processes 
- The board and remuneration committee 
are strategic advisors to executives 
- Executives have input into how their 
remuneration is structured 
- The board and remuneration 
committee, comprised of mainly 
independent non-executive directors, 
monitor executives and contract with 
them at arm’s length 
1 These columns are verbatim from Zajac and Westphal (2004, p.436), except for the italicised text.  The 
italicised text is based on my understanding of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
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Both Logics have wide-ranging normative implications for executive remuneration as shown in 
Table 1.  Corporate Logic is akin to a fixed pay philosophy, where executives are remunerated 
competitively and fairly.  As executives are stewards who put shareholders’ interests ahead of their 
own, monitoring and incentives are not required to the extent that Investor Logic implies (Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990).  On the other hand, Investor Logic is akin to a variable pay 
philosophy, where executives are remunerated for their individual contributions to firm 
performance.  As executives are agents who put their interests ahead of shareholders’ interests, 
monitoring and incentives are required (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  Further, 
executives should be evaluated using external measures of firm performance, rather than internal 
measures of performance because external measures are less susceptible to manipulation by 
executives (Jensen, 2001; Jensen et al., 2005; Stern et al., 1997).  While Corporate Logic denies that 
there is a widespread agency problem, Investor Logic assumes that there is such a problem and it 
can only be resolved with incentive schemes. 
 
There is a small but growing body of research on institutional logics in general (for a review, see 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) and on Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (Green et al., 2008; Lok, 
2010; Shipilov et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  The latter research has investigated several 
aspects of corporate governance.  Notably, Zajac and Westphal (2004) found that there had been a 
transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in terms of what US investors perceive as the 
legitimate discourse.   However, their earlier research revealed that both Logics were embedded in 
US companies’ justifications of the adoption of long-term incentive schemes, although there was a 
strengthening of Investor Logic over time (Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Further, Lok (2010) found 
that both Logics were embedded in UK discourse on corporate governance.  However, this prior 
research has not investigated many of the implications that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
have for executive remuneration.  This is a significant gap in knowledge. 
 
Since the early 1990s in the UK and since the early 2000s in most countries, companies have either 
voluntarily or been required to increase the proportion of independent directors, increase the 
proportion of performance-based remuneration, increase disclosure of executive remuneration 
(Chambers and Weight, 2008; Solomon, 2007).  There has also been increased shareholder activism 
(Solomon, 2007).  These trends are consistent with a shift from managerial capitalism to investor 
capitalism (Boyer, 2005; Englander and Kaufman, 2004; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  In particular, 
Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that there was a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic 
in the US during the 1980s.  This is exemplified by Frydman and Saks (2010) findings that CEO 
pay in large US companies was relative flat from the late 1940s to late 1970s, rose steadily in the 
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1980s and then rose dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s.  Nowadays, Investor Logic is dominant in 
Anglo-American countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).   
 
Englander and Kaufman (2004) and Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that the mindset of US 
investors, politicians and others shifted from Corporate Logic in the 1970s to Investor Logic in the 
1980s.  This was reflected in changing attitudes towards conglomerates: From their being ‘the 
engine of’ to their being ‘the problem with’ the American economy (Davis et al., 1994).  The 
takeovers movement in the 1980s and institutional investor activism in the 1990s led to US 
companies becoming specialised rather than diversified (Holstrom and Kaplan, 2001; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).  US executives were awarded ever-increasing grants of share options in the 1990s 
and restricted shares in the 2000s in order to ensure that shareholder value was maximised (Murphy, 
2011).  However, it may be that US executives have used Investor Logic as a rhetoric to justify 
increasing levels of executive remuneration irrespective of changes in shareholder value (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004; Boyer, 2005; Englander and Kaufman, 2004; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
 
Prior research has shown that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are widely diffused discourses 
which influence how corporate governance is practiced.  In Canada, the UK and the US, Investor 
Logic is dominant, particularly in the discourse of the media and regulators, but Corporate Logic is 
still active in the discourse of directors and executives (Green et al., 2008; Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001; Lok, 2010; Pye, 2000, 2001, 2002; Shipilov et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 
2004).  In Germany, Investor Logic and Stakeholder Logic are competing for dominance (Chizema, 
2008, 2010; Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).  Collectively, these studies 
have shown evidence of a battle between institutional logics in written texts including corporate 
annual reports, media articles, corporate governance codes, listing rules and corporate laws.  
Further, these studies have shown that this battle is multifaceted as directors, executives, investors, 
media and regulators have different beliefs and interests, and some companies are decoupling their 
discourse and practices.   
 
Prior research on the diffusion of institutional logics has been narrowly focused.  While corporate 
annual reports often exceed 100 pages, studies have only analysed statements on the corporate 
objective (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006) and justifications of long-term incentive plans and stock 
repurchase plans (Zajac and Westphal, 1995, 2004).  These studies have only studied two corporate 
objectives, shareholder and stakeholder value maximisation, and two justifications, agency theory 
language and human resources management language.  Further, a multitude of practices are 
described in corporate annual reports, but studies have been limited to value-based management 
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systems, executive share option plans/long-term incentive plans and international accounting 
standards (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007) as well as stock repurchase 
plans (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  However, institutional logics of corporate governance have a 
broad range of implications for how corporate governance and executive remuneration are practiced 
(see Table 1).  Future research should examine these broader implications. 
 
2.3. Remuneration Principles 
There is a small but growing body of research that has identified a range of remuneration principles 
that directors use to make and justify remuneration decisions (e.g. Bender, 2004; Crombie et al., 
2010; St-Onge et al., 2001).  In general terms, remuneration principles assert that competitive levels 
of remuneration are required to attract, motivate and retain talented executives, but their 
remuneration should also be dependent on individual and company performance as well as being 
fair to other employees and shareholders.  These remuneration principles assert that executive 
remuneration practices influence the behaviour of executives, which in turn influences 
organisational behaviour and outcomes.  These remuneration principles are consistent with either 
Corporate Logic or Investor Logic (see Table 1).  For example, Zajac and Westphal (1995) found 
that most companies justified the adoption of long-term incentive plans by claiming that the plans 
will align the interests of executives with those of shareholders, indicative of Investor Logic.    
 
Table 2 summarises the principles that are commonly found in codes (Crombie et al., 2010) and 
corporate annual reports (Crombie et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995), and 
commonly opined by executives, directors and remuneration consultants (Bender, 2004, 2007, 
2011; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008, 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2008, 2011; Pepper et 
al., 2012; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; St-Onge et al., 2001).  Included in Table 2 are definitions of 
the principles as well as a brief discussion of whether or not the principles are consistent with 
Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic.  Zajac and Westphal (2004, p.436) only theorised one 
remuneration principle for each of the Logics: Corporate Logic implies that directors will “Use 
salary and other rewards to attract and retain scarce management talent”, while Investor Logic 
implies that directors will “Use incentives to align management and shareholder interests”.  
However, it is shown that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are consistent with a range of 
remuneration principles and have a much broader range of implications for executive remuneration 
than Zajac and Westphal (2004) had envisioned. 
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Table 2: Principles of Executive Remuneration 
Principles Definitions Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Agency The interests of executives diverge from those 
of shareholders, but can be aligned using 
performance-based remuneration. 
As Corporate Logic assumes that the interests 
of shareholders and executives do not diverge, 
it is incompatible with the agency principle. 
Investor Logic is synonymous with the agency 
principle as it assumes that the interests of 
shareholders and executives diverge.  
Conformance Executive remuneration practices should be 
consistent with best practice and (powerful and 
salient) stakeholders’ expectations. 
The conformance principle is consistent with 
Corporate Logic, unless shareholders’ 
expectations vary from best practice or non-
shareholding stakeholders’ expectations. 
The conformance principle is consistent with 
Investor Logic, unless shareholders’ 
expectations vary from best practice or non-
shareholding stakeholders’ expectations. 
Fairness Executive remuneration should be equitable, 
fair and reasonable. Executive remuneration 
practices should account for vertical equity 
between executives and employees. 
The fairness principle is consistent with 
Corporate Logic: To aid succession planning, 
employees (as future executives) should be 
rewarded proportionally to executives.  
The fairness principle is inconsistent with 
Investor Logic.  Remuneration should be based 
on executives’ (and employees’) individual 
contributions to shareholder value. 
Human resources To attract and retain talented executives, 
executive remuneration packages should be 
tailored to their preferences. 
Corporate Logic is synonymous with the human 
resources principle as it asserts that executives 
should be treated with respect and dignity. 
Investor Logic is incompatible with the human 
resources principle because it asserts that 
executives are replaceable (i.e. not talented) and 
malleable (i.e. incentives can programme 
executives to maximise shareholder value). 
Market Executives should be paid comparably to other 
executives in similar roles and with similar skill 
sets (i.e. horizontal equity).  
The market principle is consistent with 
Corporate Logic, as it promotes the equitable 
treatment of all executives. 
The market principle is inconsistent with 
Investor Logic, but how much other executives 
are paid is relevant information.
1
 
Motivation  Executive remuneration practices should be 
designed to maximise the effort of executives. 
The motivation principle is inconsistent with 
Corporate Logic because executives are 
assumed to be intrinsically motivated.  
The motivation principle is consistent with 
Investor Logic because executives are assumed 
to be extrinsically motivated. 
Pay-for-performance Executive remuneration should vary with firm 
performance. That is, executives’ remuneration 
should be ‘at-risk’ or only awarded if firm 
performance meets or exceeds expectations. 
The pay-for-performance principle is 
inconsistent with Corporate Logic, unless 
variable remuneration is conceptualised as a 
sharing of rewards (or profits) between 
shareholders and executives. 
The pay-for-performance principle is consistent 
with Investor Logic, particularly if variable pay 
is a large proportion of total remuneration.  This 
ensures that executives are only paid if they add 
shareholder value. 
Responsibility Remuneration should vary with the executives’ 
level of responsibility (or managerial 
discretion). 
If responsibility is equated to position in the 
organisational hierarchy, then the responsibility 
principle is consistent with Corporate Logic’s 
concern for horizontal and vertical equity. 
If responsibility is equated to an executive’s 
ability to influence firm performance, then the 
responsibility principle is consistent with 
Investor Logic (i.e. pay-for-performance).  
Note: 
1 Executive remuneration will be set between the market rate (the amount that comparable executives are paid) and executives’ individual contribution to shareholder 
value (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  However, Crystal (1991) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive remuneration can be ratcheted upwards through the 
use of biased market comparisons.  Similarly, Hayes and Schaefer (2009) suggest that executive remuneration can be ratcheted upwards because boards of directors 
may believe that their executives are above average performers.  For these reasons, the market principle will be deemphasised. 
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Remuneration principles enable and constrain how remuneration committees make decisions.  
Remuneration committees are required to comply with or explain why they do not comply with the 
recommendations of codes.  These recommendations are based on multiple remuneration principles 
(Crombie et al., 2010; Point and Tyson, 2006).  In this respect, regulative and normative elements 
act as a constraint on remuneration committees. For example, Point and Tyson (2006, p.827) found 
that “most [corporate annual] reports contain sections which ‘cut and paste’ from codes…”  Put 
differently, remuneration committees risk damaging organisational legitimacy if their decisions are 
not consistent with societal expectations (Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 
2011).  On the other hand, remuneration committees can use remuneration principles to justify and 
legitimise most remuneration practices because remuneration principles are flexible and open to 
interpretation.  For example, the pay-for-performance principle does not define how pay and 
performance are to be measured.  Remuneration principles afford remuneration committees much 
discretion in decision-making.   
 
Remuneration committees also have to manage tensions between remuneration principles.  All of 
the remuneration principles cannot be simultaneously enacted.  For example, remuneration 
committees cannot enact the fairness, market and pay-for-performance principles if there are 
different proportional changes in the market rate for executives, the market rate for employees and 
firm performance.  To manage these tensions, remuneration committees will have to make 
compromises or prioritise the remuneration principles.  Empirical evidence indicates there is a 
significant tension between agency/pay-for-performance principles and human resources/market 
principles (Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  This arises 
because there is also “a profound tension among the demands of shareholders, management, and 
other stakeholders” (Hermanson et al., 2011, p.2).  Similarly, Main et al. (2008) found that 
remuneration committees have to ensure that their decisions satisfy both executives and 
shareholders.  Interestingly, Ogden and Watson (2011) found that remuneration committees 
prioritise human resources/market principles ahead of other principles because directors believe that 
executives will go elsewhere if they are under-remunerated relative to their peers.   
 
There have been a few studies on the diffusion of remuneration principles.  Zajac and Westphal 
(1995) found that US companies were more likely justify the adoption of long-term incentive plans 
with the human resources principle when the CEO was powerful, firm performance was high or 
during the late 1970s; and with the agency principle when the board was powerful, firm 
performance was low or during the late 1980s.  Wade et al. (1997) found that US companies 
justified CEO pay with the pay-for-performance principle, but how performance was defined 
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varied; and with the agency principle when ownership was widely dispersed.  Further, Point and 
Tyson (2006) found that many of the 23 European companies that were studied used the agency, 
human resources and pay-for-performance principles.  They also found that the wording of 
companies’ remuneration reports had become standardised.  Similarly, Crombie et al. (2010) found 
that largest 50 US companies’ justifications of CEO pay become increasingly homogenous between 
1998 and 2007.  In 2007, almost all companies justified CEO pay with all of the remuneration 
principles, except the fairness principle.  They also found that codes included most remuneration 
principles.  This is consistent with both Logics being diffused and institutionalised in the US. 
 
Prior research has found that all remuneration principles have been widely diffused in codes and 
corporate annual reports over time (Crombie et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1997).  While Zajac and 
Westphal (1995) found that there was a transition in justification of long-term incentive plans from 
the human resources principle to the agency principle, Crombie et al. (2010) found that both of 
these principles and others were used to justify CEO pay in 2007.  Drawing on institutional theory, 
Crombie et al. (2010) and Point and Tyson (2006) argue that coercive and normative pressures, in 
the form of codes, have led to the diffusion of multiple remuneration principles.  They also contend 
that mimetic pressure will influence the adoption of remuneration principles.  However, prior 
research has been limited in the range of countries studied.  US companies have been studied in 
three of four papers reviewed (Crombie et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995), 
while Point and Tyson’s (2006) study of 23 European companies was exploratory.  Further research 
is required to ascertain if this diffusion of remuneration principles is a global trend.   
 
Adding to the diffusion research, qualitative studies have found that remuneration committees use 
remuneration principles to make, justify and interpret decisions (Bender, 2004, 2007; Hermanson et 
al., 2011; Main et al, 2008, 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Ogden and Watson, 2008, 2011) and 
to manage stakeholders’ impressions (Bender, 2011; Hermanson et al., 2011).  For example, Bender 
(2004) found that directors justify the adoption of performance-related remuneration with multiple 
remuneration principles.  To ensure that decisions are legitimate, directors use remuneration 
principles to make and justify their decisions and remuneration consultants to provide 
recommendations and endorse their decisions (Bender, 2004, 2007; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et 
al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Ogden and Watson, 2008, 2011).  For example, Main et al. 
(2008, p.234) found that “[Remuneration] Committees seek legitimacy for their decisions by 
recourse to norms and rules of thumb…”  This search for legitimacy has both substantive and 
symbolic elements.  Further, the use of a range of remuneration principles is consistent with the 
diffusion and institutionalisation of both Logics. 
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2.4. Remuneration Practices 
There are two general types of executive remuneration practices: Fixed and variable (relative to 
performance).  Fixed remuneration includes salary, benefits and pension (or superannuation) as well 
as recruitment, retention and severance payments.  These latter payments are often conditional on 
length of service (Chambers and Weight, 2008).  Variable remuneration includes short-term and 
long-term incentives, which are dependent on financial, non-financial and/or market-based 
performance (e.g. total shareholder return) (Chambers and Weight, 2008).  The remuneration 
committee has to decide what remuneration practices to use, what performance measures to use, 
how to set targets for performance measures, the amount of potential remuneration if targets are met 
(e.g. multiple of salary), and the mix and level of fixed and variable remuneration.  Corporate Logic 
is consistent with executive remuneration packages that are weighted towards fixed remuneration 
and have flexible targets linked to multiple performance measures, while Investor Logic is 
consistent with executive remuneration packages that are weighted towards variable remuneration 
and have rigid targets linked to shareholder value (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 
There has been surprisingly little research that has documented the executive remuneration practices 
that are used by companies.  Typically, executive remuneration practices are discussed in books 
(e.g. Chambers and Weight, 2008; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), rather than journal articles.  Surveys 
of executive remuneration practices are limited to those published by remuneration consultants (e.g. 
Tower Perrins and Frederick W. Cook & Co).  Instead, most research has studied the relationship 
between the amount of executive remuneration and firm performance (Devers et al., 2007; Gerhart 
et al., 2009; Tosi et al., 2000).  However, to study how institutional logics are embedded in 
discourse and influence practice necessitates the documenting of both executive remuneration 
practices and justifications of these practices.  Several studies of corporate annual reports have 
shown that companies use a range of remuneration principles to justify executive remuneration 
practices (Crombie et al., 2010; Point and Tyson, 2006; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995).  But these studies have not examined how the range of executive remuneration practices are 
justified and if these justifications are coherent and logical as a whole.   
 
Table 3 outlines the expected differences between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in terms of 
executive remuneration practices and the remuneration principles tied to those practices.  There has 
only been a single study on the implications that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have for 
executive remuneration practices. Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that the adoption of new long-
term incentive schemes was justified with the human resources principle (Corporate Logic) and/or 
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the agency principle (Investor Logic). However, they did not investigate whether the structure of 
these long-term incentive schemes varied depending on the justification provided.  Thus, prior 
research provides almost no guidance on how executive remuneration practices vary between 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  The expected differences detailed in Table 3 are drawn from 
agency and stewardship theories’ implications for executive remuneration practices (Davis et al., 
1997; Grundei, 2008; Jensen et al., 2005).  While executive remuneration practices consistent with 
Corporate Logic emphasise trust and professional autonomy, those consistent with Investor Logic 
emphasis control and direction. 
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Table 3: Executive Remuneration Practices 
Components Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Fixed Remuneration   
1. Base salary and benefits Practice: Level is positioned at the median relative to peers, although 
may be constrained by the rate of change in employees’ salaries and 
wages.  However, it is inconsistent with Corporate Logic if the level 
is positioned above the median relative to peers.  
Justification: Fairness, human resources and market principles. 
Alternative practices:  
a. Level positioned at median (or below) relative to peers.  
b. Level is positioned at upper quartile relative to peers for 
executives deemed to be high performers.  If this occurs, base 
salary is another type of variable remuneration. 
Justification: Pay-for-performance principle. 
2. Pension / 
Superannuation 
Scheme: Defined benefit, which offers executives certainty. 
Level: Median relative to peers. 
Justification: Fairness, human resources and market principles. 
Scheme: Defined contribution, which limits company liabilities. 
Level: Median (or below) relative to peers. 
Justification: Pay-for-performance principle. 
3. One-off payments for 
recruitment, retention 
and severance 
Practice: Payments are conditional on continuous employment, and 
severance payments are unconditional.  None are conditional on 
performance, which demonstrates trust in executives.  
Justification: Human resources principle. 
Practice: Payments are conditional on performance targets. Note: 
Severance payments are inconsistent with Investor Logic because 
they are a sign of excessive executive power. 
Justification: Motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
Variable Remuneration   
4. Short-term incentives 
(Annual bonus) 
Performance measures: Financial and non-financial. Balanced 
scorecard preferred, but financial is the ultimate end. 
Incentive: Cash or shares paid immediately. Also, profit-sharing. 
Justification: Internal measures reflect ‘true’ firm performance; The 
Fairness principle for profit-sharing (including employees). 
Performance measures: Financial and non-financial, but financial are 
weighted higher.  Economic Value Added
TM
 preferred. 
Incentive: Cash or shares with a portion deferred for 1-3 years. 
Justification: Internal measures can be manipulated by executives; 
Agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
5. Long-term incentives Schemes: Unconditional share options with a vesting period of 5-10 
years, or restricted shares that executives purchase using interest-free 
loans. 
Performance measures: But if conditional, financial (e.g. earnings per 
share) preferred, so that executives have a degree of control. 
Justification: Human resources principle. 
Schemes: Share options or restricted shares which are conditional on 
shareholder-oriented targets with a vesting period of 3-5 years. 
Performance measures: External (e.g. total shareholder return relative 
to competitors) preferred as executives cannot manipulate. 
Justification: Agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
6. Minimum shareholding 
requirements 
Not required, but executives are not discouraged from owning shares. Practice: The value of the minimum shareholding is expressed as a 
percentage of base salary.  
Justification: Agency principle. 
Total Remuneration   
7. Mix of fixed and 
variable 
Desired mix: High proportion of fixed remuneration. 
Justification: Executives are trusted to act in the best interests of 
shareholders without the need to be coerced by incentives. 
Desired mix: High proportion of variable remuneration. 
Justification: Agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
8. Level of fixed, variable 
and total 
Level is positioned at median relative to peers, although may be 
constrained by the rate of change in employees’ salaries and wages. 
Justification: Fairness, human resources and market principles. 
Level is positioned at lower-quartile/median/upper-quartile relative to 
peers with below-average/average/above-average firm performance. 
Justification: Pay-for-performance principle. 
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Fixed remuneration consists of salary, benefits, pension and other payments.  To reward executives 
for their commitment and loyalty to the company, their fixed remuneration will not vary wildly, and 
recruitment, retention and severance payments will only be conditional on length of service.  This is 
consistent with Corporate Logic because executives are assumed to act in the best interests of 
shareholders when there are no incentive schemes.  However, executives do expect to be treated 
with respect and dignity and remunerated at a level that is comparable to their peers (e.g. median), 
although this may be constrained by employees’ general wage increases.  This line of reasoning is 
inconsistent with Investor Logic.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Jensen et al. (2005) argue that 
under such arrangements executives will reduce the variability in earnings (i.e. reduce risk of 
corporate failure) in order to protect their jobs.  Under Investor Logic, fixed remuneration is either 
reduced or converted into variable remuneration (e.g. a portion of base salaries may be ‘at-risk’). 
 
Variable remuneration consists of short- and long-term incentive schemes. If executives act as 
stewards, then short- and long-term incentive schemes are not required (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 
2008).  Further, if executives, who are stewards, receive mainly variable remuneration, then they 
may feel that they are not trusted, lose intrinsic motivation and, possibly, turn into agents (Frey and 
Osterloh, 2005; Ghoshal, 2005).  Thus, short- and long-term incentive schemes are inconsistent 
with Corporate Logic.  However, profit-sharing is consistent with Corporate Logic.  On the other 
hand, Investor Logic assumes that executives act as agents, so both short- and long-term incentive 
schemes are required to control and direct them.  It is assumed that executives’ individual 
contributions to firm performance can be measured and valued (Jensen et al., 2005).  Variable 
remuneration arrangements must strike a balance between the near-future and distance-future, so 
that executives are motivated to perform in the present without taking excessive risks (Jensen, 2005; 
Jensen et al., 2005).  Moreover, executives must own shares, so that they think and act like an 
owner and have ‘skin in the game’ (Jensen et al., 2005).  
 
There are a wide variety of performance measures on which short- and long-term incentives may 
depend including internal measures that may be financial or non-financial, and external measures 
such Economic Value Added
TM
 and total shareholder return.  Note that Economic Value Added
TM
 
is considered to be an external measure because the capital charge, which is deducted from profit, is 
based on the market’s required rate of return (Stern et al., 1997).  Irrespective of whether 
performance measures are tied to incentives, executives still have to measure firm performance.  
Under Corporate Logic, internal measures are preferred because executives are assumed to know 
how to allocate resources better than capital markets (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  A balance 
scorecard approach may be preferred because improving non-financial performance is believed to 
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improve financial performance (Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan and Nagel, 2003).  On the other hand, 
external measures are preferred if executives are assumed to be agents that are capable of 
manipulating internal measures (Jensen et al., 2005).  Investor Logic is consistent with short- and 
long-term incentives being dependent on external measures so that executives are programmed to 
maximise shareholder value over the long-term (Jensen, 2001; Stern et al., 1997). 
 
Consistent with Corporate Logic, executives should receive mainly fixed remuneration and their 
total remuneration should be comparable to other executives in similar roles, although it may be 
constrained by their employees’ working conditions (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 2008).  
Remunerating executives at the upper quartile relative to their peers is inconsistent with Corporate 
Logic, unless employees are also remunerated at the upper quartile.  On the other hand, Investor 
Logic asserts that executive remuneration should vary with firm performance.  If executives are 
paid at the upper-quartile relative to their peers in the absence of superior performance, then this is a 
sign of managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen et al., 2005).  However, prior research 
has rarely examined executive remuneration practices in the fine-grained detail that is outlined in 
Table 3.  It is not known if there are two or more groups of companies: For example, some with 
practices consistent with Corporate Logic and others with practices consistent with Investor Logic.  
Further research is required to understand how, if at all, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
influence how companies structure and justify their executive remuneration practices. 
 
3. Research Method 
The main limitation of studying a large sample of organisational texts is that few features of those 
texts can be studied.  Prior research on institutional logics has used the human resources principle as 
a measure of Corporate Logic and the agency principle as a measure of Investor Logic (Westphal 
and Zajac, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  However, this reductionist approach ignores the 
complexities and nuances of organisational texts.  This limitation is overcome in the present study 
by examining multiple features of a small sample of organisational texts.  In doing so, this research 
examines how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse on executive 
remuneration in AU, NZ and the UK.  It may be that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are 
competing or coexisting in the discourse (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Consistent with coexistence, 
for example, St-Onge et al. (2001) found that Canadian executives used multiple remuneration 
principles to justify the adoption of executive share option plans.  Therefore, the following research 
question is explored: 
 
How, if at all, have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influenced how executive 
remuneration has been conceptualised in AU, NZ and UK organisational texts? 
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3.1. Countries Studied 
Three countries, AU, NZ and the UK, were selected as opportune sites to study Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic for several reasons.  First, Corporate Logic is likely to be weak in the US 
because Wall Street exerts pressure on executives to meet quarterly earnings targets (Boyer, 2005; 
Jensen, 2005; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  The US is not an opportune site to study the tension 
between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Second, Corporate Logic is likely to be stronger in 
AU, NZ and the UK compared to the US because AU, NZ and UK companies have comparatively 
conservative approaches to executive remuneration (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Fernandes et al., 
2009; Mishel et al., 2007).  Third, despite this conservative approach, there has been much public 
outrage in AU and the UK, but not in NZ, over cases of executives receiving large pay increases for 
no apparent reason or when their companies have (almost) failed (AU: Productivity Commission, 
2009; UK: Chambers and Weight, 2008).  Consistent with a strengthening of Investor Logic, AU 
and UK Governments have bolstered remuneration disclosure requirements and shareholder rights 
(e.g. AU’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) 
Act 2004; UK’s Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002).   
 
The tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in three different organisation fields is 
investigated.  The UK has been the leader in corporate governance reform, although business has 
led much of this reform (Jones and Pollitt, 2004; Solomon, 2007).  It has provided a blueprint for 
corporate governance reform in other countries (Enrione et al., 2006).  AU rapidly adopted the 
UK’s reforms (Hill, 2006, 2008).  In addition, AU and UK code issuers have produced many 
official reports and codes that include discussion of and recommendations on corporate governance 
and executive remuneration (Chambers and Weight, 2008; du Plessis et al., 2005; Solomon, 2007).  
These changes are indicative of a strengthening of Investor Logic.  However, prior research has not 
studied how these changes in AU and the UK have influenced how Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic are embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration.  Further, while there have been 
changes in NZ, the changes in terms of executive remuneration have been negligible.  Thus, NZ is 
an opportune site to study how both Logics are embedded in the discourse in the near-absence of 
regulation and codes related to executive remuneration.  
 
3.2. Sampled Texts 
Table 4 details the sample of codes and corporate annual reports that were purposively selected.  
The sample includes 55 codes (1991-2010) produced by four UK code issuers, six AU code issuers 
and four NZ code issuers, as well as 75 corporate annual reports (1989 for UK only, 1998 and 2007) 
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produced by eleven UK companies, nine AU companies and thirteen NZ companies.  While the size 
of the sample is small relative to the size of samples in prior research (e.g. Zajac and Westphal, 
1995), it is large relative to prior research that uses discourse analysis (e.g. Craig and Amernic, 
2004).  The sample size was purposely selected in order to: first, reveal the maximum variation in 
executive remuneration policies and practices (Saunders et al., 2009); and second, understand how 
code issuers’ recommendations and companies’ remuneration policies and practices changed over 
time. Codes issuers that produced multiple codes over time were selected.  Companies were 
selected from a larger sample of the largest 50 companies by market capitalisation in AU, NZ and 
the UK.  Further explanation of how the texts were selected is given below. 
 
Table 4: Sample of Codes and Corporate Annual Reports 
Countries Codes Corporate Annual Reports 
 # of Codes # of Code Issuers # of Annual Reports 
(Year) 
# of Companies 
UK 22 4 10 (1989) 
10 (1998) 
11 (2007) 
10 
10 
11 
AU 19 6 9 (1998) 
9 (2007) 
9 
9 
NZ 14 4 13 (1998) 
13 (2007) 
13 
13 
Total 55 14 75 33 
 
The sampled codes are listed in the Appendix.  Drawing on corporate governance textbooks, 
academic articles, professional articles and websites (e.g. http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php), 
all codes produced in AU, NZ and the UK were identified.  The codes are produced by a range of 
organisations including stock exchanges, stock exchange regulators, directors’ associations and 
investors’ associations.  Many codes are endorsed by multiple organisations and some codes are 
produced by multiple organisations.  Only codes with multiple editions were sampled, so that trends 
over time could be studied.  This includes the UK’s official reports (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 
1995; Hampel, 1998; etc.) because each inquiry built on those that preceded it.  This meant that 13 
codes were not included in the sample as these codes did not have multiple editions.  However, 
these particular codes did not appear to be as influential or widely cited, so this should not restrict 
the present study’s findings. 
 
The sampled corporate annual reports are also listed in the Appendix.  The sample is purposefully 
chosen to capture the maximum variation in the companies’ remuneration policies and practices.  
First, the incidence of the remuneration principles in a larger sample of the largest 50 companies 
that were listed in AU, NZ and the UK in 1989 (UK only), 1998 and 2007 was studied (see 
Crombie, 2009).  Only UK companies in 1989 were sampled because AU and NZ companies did 
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not provide meaningful remuneration disclosures prior to 1998.  1989, 1998 and 2007 were selected 
in order to ascertain the impact of corporate scandals and new disclosure requirements on 
companies’ remuneration policies and practices.  Second, a range of companies was selected from 
the larger sample which was representative of the maximum variation in terms of remuneration 
principles in the larger sample.  However, the maximum variation is limited because few 
remuneration principles are present in the older annual reports, while most remuneration principles 
are present in the newer annual reports.   
 
3.3. Discourse Analysis 
A discourse analysis was employed to study the sampled texts.  Discourse analysis is “the 
structured and systematic study of collections of interrelated texts, the processes of their 
production, dissemination and consumption, and their effects on the context in which they occur” 
(Phillips and Di Domenico, 2009, italics in original, p.551).  Bridging the macro-micro divide, 
discourse analysis generates insight into how texts are constructed to persuade readers (the micro) 
and how texts construct social reality (the macro) (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000). Further, Phillips 
and Hardy (2002) argue that the researcher’s paradigmatic assumptions vary with the focus of their 
discourse analysis.  Researchers who have a micro focus (e.g. language use in texts) will draw on 
linguistics, while researchers who have a macro focus (e.g. texts in context) will draw on 
interpretive or critical methodology.  While critical approaches tend to examine power and politics 
(e.g. how texts can legitimise those with power), interpretive approaches tend to investigate the 
construction of social reality (e.g. how texts create shared understandings). 
 
Using discourse analysis as a research method for analysing texts is fraught with difficulty. Unlike 
other research methods, there are multiple versions of discourse analysis, each of which has not 
precisely defined (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Phillips and Di Domenico, 2009).  For instance, 
Phillips and Hardy (2002) identify four types: Interpretive structuralism, critical discourse analysis, 
social linguistic analysis and critical linguistic analysis.  Most prominent in organisational studies is 
critical discourse analysis (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011; Wodak and Meyer, 2009).  Further, there 
are almost no studies of discourse that have a methodology of interpretive structuralism.  Similarly, 
there are almost no studies on corporate governance or executive remuneration that have utilised 
any variety of discourse analysis.  Thus, discourse analysis as a method and prior research that has 
utilised discourse analysis offers no formula or guide for carrying out research on the discourse on 
executive remuneration.  Phillips and Hardy (2002, p.74) confirm that “researchers need to develop 
an approach that makes sense in light of their particular study”.   
 
Institutional Logics Perspective on Executive Remuneration 
Page 21 
 
Drawing on interpretive structuralism (Phillips and Hardy, 2002), a discourse analysis is used to 
understand the discourse on executive remuneration in different institutional settings (i.e. AU, NZ 
and the UK).  Essentially, the present study investigates how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
shape how code issuers and companies construct their social reality with respect to executive 
remuneration.  Code issuers and companies may draw on one or both Logics to legitimise their 
recommendations and practices, respectively.  Multiple aspects of the discourse are studied 
including remuneration principles and remuneration practices (see Tables 2 and 3).  To gain an 
understanding of discourse, a pilot study was carried out and then the full sample was studied.  This 
is discussed next. 
 
3.4. A Pilot Study 
Following Phillips and Hardy’s (2002) advice, a pilot study of the discourse on executive 
remuneration was undertaken in order to: first, come to terms with discourse analysis as a method 
and interpretive structuralism as a methodology; and second, understand how Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration (see Crombie, 2011).  The 
sample included one recent code and one 2007 annual report from the UK, AU and NZ (six texts in 
total).  The most influential codes were selected (i.e. produced by the local regulator). Corporate 
annual reports that included the median number of the remuneration principles for each country in 
2007 were randomly selected.  Eight aspects of corporate governance and executive remuneration 
were studied.  For each aspect, the extent to which Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were 
consistent with code issuers’ recommendations and companies’ policies and practices were 
examined.  The findings showed that while the discourse is multifaceted and highly nuanced, the 
discourse is strongly consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Thus, discourse 
analysis can be used to generate insight from an institutional logics perspective.  
 
3.5. Data Collection and Analysis 
The present study’s research question concerns how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are 
embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration of code issuers and companies.  A sample of 
codes and corporate annual reports is selected in order to study this discourse.  A discourse analysis 
of executive remuneration principles and practices within the discourse is conducted to demonstrate 
the differences between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Essentially, this research method 
involved documenting the range of executive remuneration principles and practices that are 
recommended by codes issuers and adopted by companies, and then exploring how, if at all, 
Corporate Logic and Investor are embedded in these principles and practices.  Using such an 
approach to examine the discourse on executive remuneration is novel and exploratory.   
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Six remuneration principles and eight broad remuneration practices were studied (see Tables 2 and 
3).  Note that the conformance and responsibility principles were not studied as these principles are 
not well defined and are broadly consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (i.e. do 
not discriminate).  The data collection procedure involved making notes on what code issuers 
recommended and how they justified their recommendations, and on what companies practiced and 
how they justified their practices.  Sections of the sampled codes and corporate annual reports that 
related to executive remuneration were read multiple times.  Also, keyword searches were used to 
detect the presence of specific remuneration principles and practices.  Further, notes were also made 
on other features of the texts such as the corporate objective that was recommended or practiced.  
These notes generated some insight into the code issuers and companies.  Overall, the notes were 
brief for the most texts, but were quite extensive for AU and UK 2007 corporate annual reports. 
 
There were two phases to the data analysis.  First, the range of recommend and adopted practices 
and the range of justifications of the practices found in the sampled codes and corporate annual 
reports by country and time period was ascertained.  This purposive sampling was used to “collect 
data to describe and explain the key themes that can be observed” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.239).  
This enables possible trends to be detected and analysed further.  As expected, the range was 
limited because code issuers’ recommendations are non-specific and companies’ remuneration 
disclosures are minimal, particularly on why certain practices are adopted.
3
  However, some AU 
companies in 2007, some UK companies in 1998 and most UK companies in 2007 disclosed a lot of 
specific information on executive remuneration.  As a result, the examples provided in the findings 
are drawn mainly from these companies.  Second and more importantly, the various 
recommendations and practices were categorised as being consistent with no Logic, Corporate 
Logic, Investor Logic or both Logics.  The theoretical underpinnings of the institutional logics were 
used to guide this categorisation (see Tables 1, 2 and 3).   
 
There are several limitations to this discourse analysis. First and most significantly, non-financial 
(intrinsic and extrinsic) rewards are ignored because there is almost no discussion of these rewards 
in codes and corporate annual reports.  For example, a company may appear to have a humble 
executive remuneration policy, but they may reward their executives using other rewards such as 
corporate jets, chauffeured limousines, extravagant offices, etc.  This is a significant limitation 
because the critical difference between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic concerns how 
                                                 
3
 A notable exception is the UK’s Greenbury (1995) report on directors’ remuneration. This text is very different to the 
other codes in the sample because it includes detailed and specific recommendations. 
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executives are assumed to behave.  Second, the findings cannot be generalised to the population.  
Third, the examples could have been selected in a biased or haphazard manner, although the pilot 
study demonstrates that the discourse on executive remuneration has been studied thoroughly and 
systematically.  However, it is recognised that most examples in findings are from AU and UK 
corporate annual reports in 2007.  Overall, these limitations highlight that this discourse analysis is 
exploratory. 
 
4. Findings 
The discourse analysis reveals that both Logics were embedded in the discourse because the 
remuneration principles (except the fairness principle) were widely diffused in the sampled texts 
and were tied to various executive remuneration practices.  Both Logics were able to co-exist in the 
discourse because Corporate Logic had been weakened (as the fairness principle was almost never 
tied to any executive remuneration practices).  Further, there was a standard remuneration package 
for executives that became increasingly complex and more heavily justified over time.  Code issuers 
and companies argued that executives were capable of maximising shareholder value, but only if 
boards of director implemented short- and long-term incentive schemes to control and direct them.  
Simpler packages and alternative justifications no longer appeared to be legitimate.  This is 
consistent with Investor Logic being stronger than Corporate Logic.  However, the complexity in 
the discourse also meant that almost any executive remuneration practice could be justified, 
particularly if the justifications were symbolic. 
 
4.1. Remuneration Principles 
The full range of remuneration principles were found in the sampled codes and corporate annual 
reports.  This is indicative of both Logics being embedded in the discourse on executive 
remuneration.  There was a greater incidence of the remuneration principles in newer texts and in 
UK and AU texts, although all remuneration principles were found in some older texts (e.g. 
Greenbury, 1995, UK).  While both Logics coexist in the discourse, there appeared to be a 
strengthening of Investor Logic as the agency and pay-for-performance principles dominated, 
particularly as justifications for long-term incentives (see Section 4.2).  The remuneration principles 
were labelled as principles, objectives, strategies and policies in codes and corporate annual reports.  
Essentially, the remuneration principles provided a framework for recommendations in codes or 
remuneration practices in corporate annual reports.  As the cornerstone of the discourse, the 
remuneration principles represent the shared beliefs of code issuers and companies, the objectives 
that they strive to meet and a justification (or defence) of executive remuneration practices.  These 
features of the remuneration principles are further discussed in the remainder of this section. 
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As a set, the remuneration principles represent the shared beliefs of or a language for codes issuers 
and companies.  It is near impossible to know when the remuneration principles became widely 
diffused because there is limited disclosure on remuneration prior to 1996 in the UK (when the 
London Stock Exchange annexed Greenbury’s code) and 2001 in AU (when the Corporations Act’s 
remuneration disclosure requirements were introduced).  Note that there is still limited disclosure on 
remuneration in NZ.  Given that many directors and executives were part of the committee that 
drafted the Greenbury report and many directors and executives made submissions to the 
committee, it is likely that the remuneration principles were embedded in the discourse well before 
the issuance of the Greenbury report in 1995.  Similar reasoning applies to the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s (ASXCGC’s) code issued in 2003 and NZ Securities Commission’s code 
issued in 2004.  In effect, the debate on how to frame executive remuneration has been concluded 
long ago because both code issuers and companies are wedded to the remuneration principles.  That 
is, the remuneration principles define societal expectations on executive remuneration.  
 
Table 5 presents the remuneration policies of selected AU, NZ and UK code issuers and companies.  
There is a high incidence of the remuneration principles in each of the policies, although there is 
low incidence of the fairness principle relative to the other remuneration principles.  Also, the 
incidence of the remuneration principles was higher in recent texts and higher in AU and UK texts.  
The overall incidence was lower in NZ texts, but not insignificant.  This highlights that both Logics 
are embedded in the discourse, but Investor Logic is stronger than Corporate Logic.  The underlying 
assumptions are that (1) executives are self-interested and effort-adverse because monetary 
incentives are required to align their interests with those of shareholders and to motivate them; (2) 
executives are a scarce resource that can bought; and (3) executives are ‘talented’ in that they know 
how to maximise firm performance, but will only do so if they are given a competitive level of 
remuneration and monetary incentives.   
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Table 5: Selected Remuneration Policies in AU, NZ and UK Codes and Corporate Annual Reports 
Country Code 1998 Annual Report 2007 Annual Report 
United 
Kingdom 
Financial Reporting Council (2006, pp.11-12): 
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to 
attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality 
required to run the company successfully, but a 
company should avoid paying more than is necessary 
for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive 
directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to 
link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance… There should be a formal and 
transparent procedure for developing policy on 
executive remuneration and for fixing the 
remuneration packages of individual directors. No 
director should be involved in deciding his or her own 
remuneration.” 
Tesco (1998, p.10): “The remuneration packages, 
including contract periods, of executive directors are 
determined by the Remuneration Committee (‘the 
Committee’). It ensures that the remuneration 
package is appropriate for their responsibilities, 
taking into consideration the overall financial and 
business position of the Group, the highly 
competitive industry of which the Group is part and 
the importance of recruiting and retaining 
management of the appropriate calibre. The 
remuneration of the non-executive directors is 
determined by the Board as a whole on the 
recommendation of the Executive Committee after 
considering external market research.”  
Legal & General Group (2007, p.49): “The Group’s 
remuneration policy is broadly consistent for all 
employees and is designed to support recruitment, 
motivation and retention. Remuneration is considered 
within… the markets in which the divisions operate. 
The policy for the majority of employees continues to 
be to pay around the relevant mid-market level with a 
package designed to align the interests of employees 
with those of shareholders, with an appropriate 
proportion of total remuneration dependent upon 
performance. Management work in partnership with 
the trade union, Unite, to ensure our pay policies and 
practices are free from unfair bias. This is monitored 
by an annual equal pay audit.” 
Australia ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003, p.51): 
“Principle 9: Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
Ensure that the level and composition of 
remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its 
relationship to corporate and individual performance 
is defined. This means that companies need to adopt 
remuneration policies that attract and maintain 
talented and motivated directors and employees so as 
to encourage enhanced performance of the company. 
It is important that there be a clear relationship 
between performance and remuneration, and that the 
policy underlying executive remuneration be 
understood by investors.” 
Westpac Banking Corporation (1998, pp.81-82): 
“Westpac has designed its executive compensation 
program to support a pay for performance policy… 
The Committee’s specific objectives are to… [1] 
Align the financial interests of executive officers with 
those of shareholders… [2] reward and motivate 
executives… [3] take into account Westpac’s… 
[relative] performance… and… individual 
contributions… [4] Provide fixed pay… to attract and 
retain key executives… that recognises the market 
value of the position as well as internal equities 
between roles… [5] Emphasise performance-based 
and equity-based compensation…” 
Brambles (2007, p.58): “The Board has adopted a 
remuneration policy… designed to attract and retain 
high calibre executives, align executive rewards with 
the creation of shareholder value and motivate 
executives to achieve challenging performance 
levels… When setting and reviewing remuneration 
levels… the Committee considers the experience, 
responsibilities and performance of the individual and 
takes account of market data relevant to the 
individual’s role… The Group’s remuneration policy 
is to pay at the median level of remuneration for 
target… performance and… upper quartile… for 
outstanding… performance.” 
New 
Zealand 
NZ Securities Commission (2004, p.17): “The 
remuneration of directors and executives should be 
transparent, fair, and reasonable. The board should 
have a clear policy for setting remuneration of 
executives (including executive directors) and non-
executive directors at levels that are fair and 
reasonable in a competitive market for the skills, 
knowledge and experience required by the entity.” 
Guinness Peat Group (1998, pp.40-41): “It remains 
the Remuneration Committee’s policy that 
remuneration and benefit levels should be sufficiently 
competitive, having regard to local remuneration 
practice in the country in which the director works, to 
attract, incentivise, reward and retain the directors… 
Share options are awarded to directors and senior 
staff… The Company does not operate any other long 
term incentive schemes nor does it normally award 
cash bonuses… The approach also aligns 
management interests with those of Shareholders.” 
The Warehouse (2007, pp.75-76): “Making sure team 
members get the rewards they deserve is the 
responsibility of the Remuneration, Talent and 
Nomination Committee… The objective of the senior 
managerial remuneration strategy is to provide 
competitive remuneration aimed at: aligning 
managers’ rewards with shareholders’ value; 
achieving business plans and corporate strategies; 
rewarding performance improvement; and retaining 
key skills and competencies…” 
 
However, the problem with these assumptions (or a high incidence of the remuneration principles) 
is that remuneration principles are assumed to be additive, but there are obvious tensions between 
the remuneration principles.  It is likely that implementing the remuneration principles requires 
prioritisation and trade-offs, but these are not taken into account by code issuers or companies.  
There is a tension between the market, fairness and pay-for-performance principles in that the level 
of remuneration for executives may change at a different rate to the level of remuneration for 
employees and the change in firm performance.  Further, there is tension between the market, 
human resources and motivation principles in that scarce managerial talent will not be attracted by 
median levels of remuneration and restrictive performance conditions, but will not be motivated by 
loose performance conditions. These tensions are glossed over in codes and corporate annual 
reports.  For example, Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA, AU, 2004, p.28) state, 
“Australian listed companies must be able to attract and reward superior executives within a 
competitive global environment. Nevertheless, remuneration must be reasonable in light of the 
circumstances of the company…”  
 
A further problem with the recommendations of code issuers and policies of companies is that the 
remuneration principles are presented as objective facts, not subjective beliefs.  At a surface level, 
the remuneration principles make sense and are difficult to oppose.  After all, a remuneration 
committee may be considered crazy or mad if they argued that remuneration should not be set at a 
competitive level, should not be used to motivate executives, or should not align executive interests 
with those of shareholders.  This speaks to the extent to which the remuneration principles have 
become taken-for-granted.  However, many of the remuneration principles are inherently flawed.  In 
particularly, many terms are ill-defined and practical application of the principles is not discussed.  
With respect to the agency principle, there is no discussion in codes and corporate annual reports on 
whether shareholders have a collective or common interest.  For instance, shareholders may have 
varying risk preferences and investment time horizons.  With respect to the pay-for-performance 
principle, the term ‘performance’ is not precisely defined in codes and corporate annual reports. 
 
Remuneration principles are also rhetorical devices that code issuers and companies employ to 
defend and justify their remuneration policies and practices.  Certainly, the sampled codes and 
corporate annual reports were meticulously crafted texts, designed to persuade readers of the 
rationality and legitimacy of their recommendations and practices, respectively.  However, it is very 
difficult to know if the remuneration principles are mere rhetoric or if the code issuers and 
companies believe in the efficacy of the remuneration principles.  In the sample, there is one 
striking example of the remuneration principles being used as rhetorical devices.  Brierley 
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Investments (NZ) faced a legitimacy crisis in 1998 and used its annual report to defend the 
legitimacy of its directors and executives as well as its remuneration policies and practices (see 
Table 6).  Brierley Investments’ 1998 Annual Report illustrates (1) how Investor Logic can become 
embedded in an organisation’s decisions on corporate governance and executive remuneration; and 
(2) how the annual report can be used as a rhetorical weapon (in an attempt) to defend an 
organisation’s legitimacy. 
 
Table 6: Remuneration Principles as Rhetoric – The Case of Brierley Investments 
Brierley Investments (NZ, 1998) represents an exemplar of Investor Logic only because of the new chairman’s 
statement in the annual report.  The company’s directors faced a major legitimacy crisis prior to the release of its 1998 
annual report.  In 1998, Brierley Investments’ share price was NZ$1.22 on 5 January, NZ$0.34 on 25 September after 
reporting a NZ$904 million loss, and NZ$0.43 on 31 December.  In the history of NZ listed companies, BIL’s $904 
million loss is second only to Air New Zealand’s $1,425 million loss in 2001.  Further, the old chairman and CEO had 
been demised in late April.  The news of the old CEO’s NZ$4 million redundancy payment accelerated the decline in 
Brierley Investments’ share price (Parker, 9 May 1998).   
 
Facing NZ’s largest ever corporate loss at the time, the release of Brierley Investments’ 1998 annual report was the 
board of directors’ last chance to present a credible recovery plan to shareholders.  At the beginning of the annual 
report, the new chairman drew on Investor Logic to craft his recovery plan.  The third page of Brierley Investments’ 
(NZ, 1998, p.1) annual report outlined the recovery plan (in a very large bold font):  
“Shareholders can expect to see a BIL [Brierley Investments Limited] in the future with improved 
corporate governance, clear lines of authority between the Board and management, executive 
remuneration inextricably linked to our performance and an investment strategy” 
 
In the body of the new chairman’s statement, he described a number of proposed changes including a new incentive 
scheme and new corporate governance structure (i.e. majority independent directors).  The agency principle was used to 
justify the adoption of Economic Value Added
TM
 as a performance measure:  
“To ensure a congruence of shareholder and management interests, it is the Board’s intention to introduce 
Economic Value Added (EVA) performance measurement principles. BIL retained EVA specialists Stern 
Stewart & Co to advise it on an incentivisation scheme that aligns executive remuneration with 
shareholder returns” (p.6) 
 
He argued that this would be beneficial for shareholders because management “will share in the downside” (p.6), 
although management not receiving a bonus is not the same as shareholders’ losing their capital: 
“To encourage management to achieve returns in excess of the risk-adjusted growth rate, incentive 
compensation will be linked directly to the management team’s achievement of wealth creation targets. If 
management fails to create wealth for shareholders, it will share in the downside.” (p.6)   
 
Reflecting on the proposed change, the new chairman’s penultimate sentence of his statement was: “Management and 
shareholder interests will be aligned, with management remunerated relative to the wealth it creates for our 
shareholders” (p.14).  The new chairman’s statement was followed by another full page quote (in a very large bold 
font): “Ultimately it is performance that shareholders demand, and the Board is intensely aware of the need to deliver” 
(p.15).  The new chairman had also announced his intention to resign at the 1998 annual general meeting.  Certainly the 
new chairman’s rhetoric was consistent with Investor Logic only.  However, as Brierley Investments (NZ) disclosed 
few other details of their executive remuneration practices in any of its previous or subsequent annual reports, a 
definitive conclusion cannot be drawn.  Further, judging the success of Brierley Investments’ 1998 annual report in 
defending the directors’ legitimacy is subjective.  Three non-executive directors were not re-elected at the 1998 annual 
general meeting, but the company continued to operate. 
 
4.2. Remuneration Practices 
There is a standard remuneration package for executives that is recommended by most code issuers 
and adopted by most companies.  As a case in point, Qantas’ (AU, 2007) executive remuneration 
package included base salary, benefits, superannuation, retention payments, short-term incentives 
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and long-term incentives.  For codes, the standard package is closely tied to the remuneration 
principles, although the discussion of alternatives and limitations is minimal (cf. Greenbury, UK, 
1995).  Long-term incentives receive the most attention in codes.  For companies, remuneration 
reports include a remuneration framework or policy, a description of each component of 
remuneration for the CEO and senior executives, and then disclosure of awarded remuneration (in 
tabular form).  The remuneration principles are embedded in the remuneration framework/policy 
and each component of remuneration, as a justification for the chosen practices.  Overall, the 
standard package is consistent with both Logics, but Investor Logic is stronger than Corporate 
Logic given the emphasis on variable remuneration and the chosen performance measures, 
particularly total shareholder return.  Each component of the standard package is discussed next. 
 
4.2.1. Fixed Remuneration 
Salaries and benefits are conceptualised using the market and pay-for-performance principles in 
codes, although this discussion is limited.  The market principle provides the underlying rationale.  
For example, Association of British Insurers (ABI, UK, 2005, p.5) stated, “When setting salary 
levels Remuneration Committees should take into consideration the requirements of the market, 
bearing in mind competitive forces…”  However, the flaw in this rationale is that most boards 
believe their executives are above average performers and should receive above average levels of 
salaries and benefits, resulting in the average increasing over time (this is known as the Lake 
Wobegon Effect, see Hayes and Schaefer, 2009).  The pay-for-performance principles and, 
occasionally, the fairness principle, act as constraints on this practice.  For instance, Greenbury 
(UK, 1995, p.37) argued, “Companies should not pay above average levels regardless of 
performance… If companies generally pursue such policies, the effect will simply be to ratchet up 
the general level of executive remuneration.”   
 
Prior to changes in remuneration disclosure requirements in the mid-2000s, many UK and AU 
companies did not disclose how salaries and benefits were determined, except to say that 
executives’ salaries were competitive in the market.  It is likely that a competitive position means 
median or above, not below median.  For example, Tesco (UK, 1998, p.10) stated, “The base 
salary… of executive directors… are… reviewed annually by the Committee, having regard to 
competitive market practice supported by two external, independent surveys.”  Some companies 
positioned salaries at the upper quartile and justified this position with the pay-for-performance 
principle.  For example, Cadbury Schweppes (UK, 2007, p.60) stated that, “Basic salary… at upper 
quartile for consistently strong or outstanding individual performance…”  Further, in applying the 
pay-for-performance principle, Newcrest Mining (AU, 2007, p.56) made executives’ salaries half 
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fixed and half variable (“salary at risk”).  Interestingly, no companies in the sample positioned base 
salary below the median.  This may result in the median being ratcheted upwards over time.   
 
Consistent with Corporate Logic, the market principle and, occasionally, the fairness principle were 
invoked by companies in justifying executives’ salaries.  However, there is a tension between the 
market and fairness principles when market rates for executives and employees change at different 
rates.  As a case in point, Sainsbury J (UK, 2007, p.38) increased the base salary of its chief 
executive at the same rate as employees’ salaries/wages in 2005 and 2006 (3.7% and 3.6%, 
respectively), but “re-aligned” the Chief Executive’s salary with the market median in 2007 (which 
was an increase of 17%).  This decision was justified as follows (2007, p.38):  
“Since his appointment in March 2004, the Chief Executive has received pay increases 
in line with colleagues… However a recent salary review showed that his base pay had 
fallen significantly behind market median levels. The Remuneration Committee 
strongly believes that it is in the interests of shareholders to re-align his base salary with 
market competitive levels.”   
 
Prioritising the market principle (i.e. horizontal equity) ahead of the fairness principle (i.e. vertical 
equity) indicates that executives are motivated by extrinsic rewards and that Corporate Logic may 
be weak or symbolic. 
 
Pension (or superannuation) schemes are rarely discussed in codes and corporate annual reports.  
Most codes required pension schemes to be disclosed.  Most companies justified fixed remuneration 
(including pensions) with the human resources and market principles, but rarely did they provide a 
separate justification for pension schemes.  There appeared to be a shift in practice as companies 
changed from defined benefit pension schemes to defined contribution pension schemes.  As a case 
in point, Brambles (AU, 2007, p.58) explained why defined benefit schemes were undesirable: 
“Some retirement benefits are delivered under defined benefit plans. The Board 
considers that defined benefit pension plans have the potential to create an unreasonable 
financial burden on the Group. No new members will therefore be admitted to such 
plans, save in exceptional circumstances.”   
 
This change in practice is consistent with a strengthening of Investor Logic because defined 
contribution pension schemes provide certainty to shareholders, not executives. 
 
There was almost no guidance on recruitment, retention and severance payments in codes, although 
most codes required such obligations to be disclosed.  Some companies offered recruitment 
payments to executives, and some of these were not conditional on performance (e.g. Pearson, UK, 
2007, p.40).  On the other hand, other companies offered recruitment payments that were 
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conditional on performance (e.g. Newcrest Mining, AU, 2007, p.65).  Further, retention payments 
may be conditional on continuous employment and/or performance (e.g. Qantas, AU, 2007, p.62).  
Additionally, others did offer severance (or early termination) payments, and were typically 
equivalent to 12-18 months of fixed or total remuneration (e.g. Newcrest Mining, AU, 2007, p.64).  
Overall, there is a tension between Corporate Logic (human resources principle) and Investor Logic 
(pay-for-performance principle) because executives are viewed as a scarce resource that may not be 
attracted and retained if too many performance conditions are included in their employment 
agreements. 
 
4.2.2. Short-term Incentive Schemes  
There is much discussion on short-term incentive schemes in codes and corporate annual reports.  
Reflecting the embedding of both Logics in the discourse, these schemes were justified using 
multiple remuneration principles.  However, codes offer few specific recommendations.  For 
example, ASXCGC (AU, 2007, p.36) recommended that, “Incentive schemes should be designed 
around appropriate performance benchmarks that measure relative performance…”  Similarly, ABI 
(UK, 2002, p.5) encouraged that “Annual bonuses, normally payable in cash… should be related to 
performance. Both individual and corporate performance targets are relevant…”  Notably, some 
codes recommended that targets should be challenging or stretching.  For example, the Financial 
Reporting Council (UK, 2003, p.21) suggested that, “…performance conditions should be relevant, 
stretching and designed to enhance shareholder value. Upper limits should be set and disclosed.” 
Most codes offered no recommendations on how targets should be set and what performance 
measures should be selected.   
 
It is difficult to determine how many companies do not use short-term incentives because of limited 
disclosure requirements in NZ, AU (prior to 2004) and the UK (prior to 1995).  Not having short-
term incentives for all executives would be consistent with Corporate Logic, but such a practice was 
almost unheard of among companies.  In a rare example, Associated British Foods (UK, 1998, p.24) 
all but rejected short-term incentives: “Performance related bonuses are not given, other than in 
exceptional circumstances…”  Further, there was variability between remuneration packages of 
executives in the same company.  For instance, Antofagasta (UK, 2007, p.71) did not award annual 
bonuses to the executive chairman, but they did award annual bonuses to other senior executives.  
More commonly, companies had a range of short-term incentive schemes that were applicable for 
the Chief Executive, executive directors and executives.   
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Companies used a range of different performance measures as part of their short-term incentive 
schemes including financial, non-financial and market-based measures (e.g. British American 
Tobacco, UK, 2007, p.60).  Most companies gave financial measures a greater weighting than other 
measures.  For example, BlueScope Steel (AU, 2007, p.48) stated, “At the senior executive level, 
60% of the STI award is based on financial/shareholder value measures with 40% based on KPI 
metrics.”  There was a target for each performance measure which had to be met for bonuses to be 
awarded.  Each performance measure had a range of targets: the minimum, expected (or on-target) 
and maximum (or stretch).  The targets are then equated to bonuses, expressed as a percentage of 
base salary.  It appears that the percentages had increased over time.  For example, Tesco’s (UK) 
maximum value as a percentage of base salary increased from 37.5% in 1998 (p.11) to 150% in 
2007 (p.29).  These practices were consistent with Investor Logic because of the implicit 
assumption in target setting that the executive’s effort is directly related to firm performance.   
 
Short-term incentives were normally paid in cash immediately after the executive’s performance 
had been evaluated and the target had been deemed to be met.  However, short-term incentives 
might also be paid as restricted shares or share options and a portion of the award might be 
deferred.  In some companies, if executives chose to defer a portion of the award, then an additional 
award would be made (this is known as ‘matching’).  While most AU and NZ companies had 
simple short-term incentive schemes, most UK and some AU companies (particularly in 2007) had 
complex short-term incentive schemes including the use of deferral and matching (e.g. Sainsbury J, 
UK, 2007, p.38; Telstra, AU, 2007, p.96).  The practice of deferring a portion of short-term 
incentives may be justified with the agency principle (e.g. Cadbury Schweppes, UK, 2007, p.62) or 
human resources principle (e.g. Westfield Group, AU, 2007, p.101).  Overall, most short-term 
incentive schemes and related justifications were consistent with both Logics. 
 
4.2.3. Long-term Incentive Schemes 
Long-term incentive schemes are justified with agency and pay-for-performance principles by 
codes issuers.  This is consistent with Investor Logic.  Most commonly, long-term incentives are 
often conceptualised as a means for aligning executives’ interests with those of shareholders.  For 
example, IFSA (AU, 2004, p.29) argues, “The granting of a right to equity participation, subject to 
appropriate performance hurdles, assists in aligning the interests of executives and shareholders.”  
Total shareholder return was often recommended as a performance measure.  However, code issuers 
did not provide a lot of specific guidance on target setting, the level of award, type of payment (cash 
or shares), and vesting period.  Crucially, most code issuers did not discuss the difference between 
awarded and realised remuneration.  Companies are required to disclose the estimated value of 
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long-term incentives when awarded to executives, but executives may never realise this value if 
targets are not met.  This can led to a perception of rewards for failure if executives are awarded 
long-term incentives when firm performance has declined.  However, executive will only realise 
value if firm performance improves.   
 
All companies appeared to have had long-term incentive schemes, although this finding is not 
definitive due to limited disclosure in older annual reports.  Consistent with both Logics, companies 
used a variety of remuneration principles to justify their long-term incentive schemes.  As a case in 
point, Fisher & Paykel Healthcare (NZ, 2007, pp.30-31) justifies their share option plan using both 
the human resources and agency principles:  
“The [remuneration] policy includes providing performance incentives which allow 
executives to share in the long term success of the Company and share option plans 
intended to encourage the retention of senior management and increase the 
commonality between the interests of management and shareholders.” 
 
The most striking aspect of Fisher & Paykel Healthcare’s remuneration policy is the phrase “… 
which allow executives to share in the long term success of the Company”.  This suggests that 
executives did not control firm performance.  Instead, profits were shared between shareholders and 
executives.  This conceptualisation of long-term incentives is consistent with Corporate Logic.  
However, most companies emphasise the agency principle over other remuneration principles when 
justifying their long-term incentive schemes (e.g. Telecom, NZ, 2007, p.89), which is consistent 
with Investor Logic. 
 
Long-term incentive schemes that AU, UK, and, to a lesser extent, NZ companies adopted were 
very complex.  This was compounded by most companies adopting multiple schemes.  The range of 
schemes included share options, restricted shares and phantom shares.  A few companies also had 
schemes that allowed executives to purchase shares using interest-free or low-interest loans (e.g. 
QBE Insurance, AU, 1998, 2007).  Further, long-term incentives were usually dependent on one, 
two or three performance measures including, but not limited to, earnings per share, return on 
capital employed and total shareholder return.  Some targets were absolute (e.g. a hurdle), while 
others were relative.  Most AU and UK companies in 2007 had relative targets for total shareholder 
return.  The schemes were often conditional on both award and exercise, although early schemes (in 
1989 and 1998) did not have exercise (or vesting) conditions.  Amongst AU and UK companies, the 
levels of awards were expressed as percentage of executives’ base salary (e.g. Legal & General 
Group, UK, 2007, p.41).  Most NZ companies did not explain how the levels of awards were 
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determined.  Similar to short-term incentives, the targets were tied to levels (e.g. minimum, 
expected and maximum).   
 
Most companies’ long-term incentive schemes were indicative of Investor Logic because of the 
emphasis placed on the agency principle and the use of targets (e.g. on award and on exercise) to 
control executives.  Interestingly, companies provided additional justification of their long-term 
incentive schemes when the aspects of the schemes were not consistent with Investor Logic.  As a 
case in point, Westfield Group (AU, 2007) explained why they did not use total shareholder return 
as a performance measure.  Essentially, Westfield Group challenged the legitimacy of Investor 
Logic because rejecting total shareholder return as a performance measures, implying that the 
market (i.e. investors as a collective) cannot accurately assess firm performance.  They (AU, 2007, 
p.102) justified their decision as follows: 
“The Committee… rejected the use of a TRS [total return to shareholders] based 
hurdle… Although the Westfield Group… has a well established record of delivering 
increases in share price over time, the philosophy of the Group has been… that the 
focus of the executive team should remain on the underlying business and not on the 
price of the Group’s securities… The Committee is of the view that if the management 
team maintains its intensive focus on these fundamentals, security holders will be 
rewarded, over time, by superior market performance.” 
 
Having minimum shareholding requirements for executives were not recommended by most code 
issuers and were not adopted by many companies.  However, minimum shareholding requirements 
were encouraged by the ABI (UK, 1999a, 2002, 2005, 2007), and adopted by some UK companies.  
Executives were usually required to set aside a portion of their salaries and/or annual bonuses to 
acquire shares.  Minimum shareholding requirements were often specified as a percentage of salary 
(e.g. Cadbury Schweppes, UK, 2007, p.62).  The agency principle is used to justify minimum 
shareholding requirements (e.g. Unilever, UK, 2007, p.51).  Unlike other incentive schemes, 
minimum shareholding requirements create downside risk for executives because they cannot lower 
their shareholding below the minimum and they have to acquire more shares if share prices fall.  
Forcing executives to acquire shares is consistent with Investor Logic, not Corporate Logic.  
However, some companies partially negate this downside risk by requiring executives to hold a 
minimum number of shares (e.g. Standard Chartered, UK, 2007, p.77).  Further, minimum 
shareholding requirements may be symbolic if the minimum is immaterial, or if executives are 
granted large number of shares (via long-term incentive schemes). 
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4.2.4. Mix and Level of Variable and Fixed Remuneration 
There was no precise mix of fixed and variable remuneration that was recommended by codes 
issuers or desired by companies.  Many codes include no guidance on what mix is appropriate or 
how to decide what is the appropriate mix.  For example, the ASXCGC (AU 2003, p.55) simply 
observed that “Most executive remuneration packages will involve a balance between fixed and 
incentive pay”, but did not define “balance”.  Most companies only disclosed their actual mix of 
fixed and variable remuneration for executives, although some AU and UK companies in 2007 did 
disclosure the desired mix (e.g. Standard Chartered, UK, 2007, p.74).  Typically, the mix was 
justified by the market principle and reference to the norm that the proportion of variable 
remuneration increases with seniority (e.g. QBE Insurance, AU, 2007, p.63).  Further, the 
proportion of variable remuneration appeared to be increasing over time. For example, Unilever 
(UK, 2007, p.51) stated, “The Committee decided not to increase the salaries in 2007 in order to 
place more emphasis on performance related pay and less on fixed pay.”  Overall, the desired mix 
tends to be weighted towards variable remuneration, which is consistent with Investor Logic. 
 
Most code issuers did not provide specific recommendations on how companies should determine 
the level of fixed, variable and total remuneration.  However, most companies did describe and 
justify how the level of each component of remuneration was determined, but they did not discuss 
how they positioned the level of total remuneration.  For example, Legal & General (UK, 2007, 
pp.51-52) disclosed that the CEO’s salary was positioned “at around the mid-market level relative 
to the FTSE 100”, short-term incentives had an expected value of 75% of salary and a maximum 
value of 125% of salary, and long-term incentives had an expected and maximum value of 200% of 
salary.  This remuneration policy was typical amongst AU and UK companies, where variable 
remuneration was tied to fixed remuneration.  NZ companies provided insufficient remuneration 
disclosure for any inference to be made.  The standard remuneration package for executives is 
inconsistent with Corporate Logic, where executives are conceptualised as stewards (e.g. intrinsic 
motivation is greater than extrinsic motivation).  On the other hand, it is consistent with Investor 
Logic, where executives are conceptualised as agents (e.g. extrinsic motivation is greater than 
intrinsic motivation). 
 
However, there appears to be a fundamental flaw in the standard remuneration package as the 
market principle overrides the other remuneration principles because most companies positioned the 
level of total remuneration at the median or above.  This flaw is known as the ratchet effect (or the 
Lake Wobegon effect).  Few companies had remuneration policies that prevented them from 
contributing to an upward ratchet of the level of executive remuneration.  A rare exception was 
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British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB, UK, 2007).
4
    They (2007, p.44) stated that, “Pay is very 
competitive if BSkyB’s stretching targets are delivered, but if these targets are not met, the 
‘guaranteed’ elements of pay are below market norms.”  According to Corporate Logic, the fairness 
principle should act as a counterweight to the human resources and market principles (cf. the UK’s 
Sainsbury J’s decision to increase their CEO’s base salary).  Accounting for employees’ working 
conditions should prevent above-average increases in executive remuneration, but few companies 
had the fairness principle built into their remuneration policies and practices.  Thus, the version of 
Corporate Logic embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration might be weak or symbolic.   
 
Overall, the main similarity between codes and corporate annual reports was that most of the 
narrative on executive remuneration was concerned with short- and long-term incentives.  The main 
difference was that codes’ recommendations were non-specific and brief, whereas companies’ 
descriptions were high nuanced and lengthy (particularly in AU and UK 2007 annual reports).  
Further, AU, NZ and UK organisational texts had a common language for conceptualising 
executive remuneration with a strong emphasis on performance-based remuneration.  Notably, AU 
and UK texts had much lengthier narratives on executive remuneration (except UK 1989 annual 
reports and AU 1998 annual reports) than NZ texts.  In addition, the main similarity between the 
oldest and most recent organisational texts was that, once again, there was a common language.  
More recent texts appeared to be developed from older texts. For codes, there were no major 
differences.  For companies, the main trend was that their executive remuneration practices began 
increasingly complex over time.  By 2007, most AU and UK companies had adopted multiple short- 
and long-term incentive schemes and there were no companies left that rejected performance-based 
remuneration (e.g. Associated British Foods, UK, 1998).  Thus, while Investor Logic and Corporate 
Logic co-exist in organisational texts, Investor Logic is stronger than Corporate Logic. 
 
5. Discussion 
The process by which remuneration committees make decisions is driven by the desire to maximise 
shareholder value both in the near and distant future (i.e. efficiency), as well as the desire to have 
their decisions perceived to be legitimate by shareholders, executives, other directors and, to a 
lesser extent, non-shareholding stakeholders (i.e. legitimacy).  Competitive and institutional 
pressures influence what is perceived as efficient and legitimate because people’s beliefs (or 
preferences) are embedded, not autonomous (Cyert and March, 1992; March and Simon, 1993).  
However, there is a distribution of beliefs.  Within this process, there is a tension between 
efficiency and legitimacy because directors and others have different beliefs about what is efficient.  
                                                 
4
 British Sky Broadcasting is not part of the sample.  However, this example is included here due to its significance. 
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Put differently, believers in Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have different perceptions of what 
is the appropriate means to achieve shareholder value maximisation. 
 
However, both Logics can co-exist in the discourse on executive remuneration because almost all 
executive remuneration practices can be justified with either Logic.  Believers in Corporate Logic 
are satisfied with executives receiving short- and long-term incentives because they perceive these 
incentives to be necessary to attract and retain talented executives and to pay executives at the 
market rate (Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Believers in Investor Logic are satisfied with executives 
receiving short- and long-term incentives because they perceive these incentives to be necessary to 
motivate executives and align executives’ interests with those of shareholders.  Further, while 
public outrage over rewards for failure, corporate scandals and financial crises have resulted in 
increased remuneration disclosure requirements and shareholder rights, it has not altered the process 
by which executive remuneration is determined.  If anything, public outrage has resulted in the 
entrenchment of the remuneration principles, the standard remuneration package and the process for 
determining remuneration. 
 
From an institutional logics perspective, the standard remuneration package for executives appears 
to be mad or insane.  Corporate Logic implies that boards should hire executives that are stewards, 
pay them competitively and then replace them if their performance is below expectations.  For 
believers in Investor Logic (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen et al., 2005), such an approach is 
mad because they believe that executives and employees are opportunistic and extrinsically 
motivated.  However, empirical evidence from the management and psychology literature indicates 
that people behave like agents and stewards as well as in other ways (Furnham, 2005; Hernandez, 
2012).  For example, in experimental research, Fong and Tosi (2007) found that irrespective of 
whether monetary incentives were offered in a task, high conscientiousness participants exhibited 
very high levels of effort and task performance.  Therefore, boards should focus their efforts on 
identifying executives that are stewards or exhibit high conscientiousness, rather than hiring 
charismatic but narcissistic executives (Khurana, 2002). 
 
On the other hand, Investor Logic implies that boards should hire executives and only pay them 
grandly if firm performance improves.  The standard remuneration package for executives appears 
to be consistent with Investor Logic.  However, it is not because of the underlying but unreasonable 
assumption that executives are capable of choosing the course of action that will maximise their 
short- and long-term incentive payments.  The rationality of executives is bounded (March and 
Simon, 1993).  As the standard package includes multiple short- and long-term incentive schemes, 
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particularly in AU and UK companies, executives are faced with an incredibly complex 
optimisation problem.  Faced with such complexity, executives are likely to heavily discount the 
value of long-term incentives and focus on the short-term (Pepper et al., 2012). Therefore, the 
standard remuneration package should be simplified.  Base salaries plus a portion of profit is 
sufficient as long as directors, who are independent, monitor executives diligently and the 
company’s accounts are audited.  Directors can simply replace executives if they focus too heavily 
on the short-term at the expense of the long-term. 
 
In 2007, no large listed companies in AU, NZ and the UK had executive remuneration practices that 
were as simple as described above.  The standard remuneration package appears to be 
institutionalised.  This means codes issuers and companies cannot conceive of any alternatives.    
While Investor Logic appears to be stronger than Corporate Logic, Corporate Logic may be 
stronger because the outcome of this complexity may be executives being paid comparably to their 
peers irrespective of firm performance (Ogden and Watson, 2011).  However, a definitive 
conclusion is not possible because the distribution of beliefs among directors, executives, investors 
and others is not known.  Further research on the distribution of beliefs is required to gain additional 
insight into the process of remuneration decision-making.  
 
The institutional identities of the non-executive director, the board and the remuneration committee 
constrain directors’ abilities to make remuneration decisions that do not fit with these identities.  
Lok (2010, p.1308) argues, “institutional logics not only direct what social actors want (interests) 
and how they are to proceed (guidelines for action), but also who or what they are (identity).”  
However, institutional identity as a concept has rarely been studied in prior research on corporate 
governance (cf. Lok, 2010).  Belief in shareholder value maximisation and performance-based 
remuneration is all but required for the non-executive director (Lok, 2010; Pye, 2000).  Also, codes 
portray the non-executive director as both a ‘judge’ and ‘problem-solver’.  For example, the UK’s 
Financial Reporting Council (2006, p.3) states, “…non-executive directors should constructively 
challenge and help develop proposals on strategy… [and] scrutinise the performance of 
management…”  As a problem-solver, the remuneration committee has a limited toolkit (e.g. short- 
and long-term incentive schemes).  Even if the remuneration committee does not believe that 
performance-based remuneration will alter executive behaviour, their institutional identity requires 
that they use it.  Further, rejecting performance-based remuneration is akin to the remuneration 
committee rejecting their identity and ability to solve problems.   
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Remuneration disclosures are part-factual and part-rhetorical.  In particular, the remuneration 
principles are truisms that cannot be easily refuted.  It is unlikely that investors, regulators and 
others will argue that companies should not attract and retain talented executives or that companies 
should not remunerate executives for their individual contributions to firm performance.  Arguing 
against the remuneration principles would constitute a rejection of the institutional identities of 
directors and executives as ‘problem-solvers’, who are capable of maximising shareholder value.  
This is unlikely given that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have become the 
institutionalised discourse on executive remuneration (Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).  The findings presented in this paper support this conclusion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The present study shows that there is shared understanding of executive remuneration among code 
issuers and companies in AU, NZ and the UK.  At the core of this shared understanding are the 
remuneration principles (except the fairness principle).   The remuneration principles are closely 
tied to executive remuneration practices.  The human resources and market principles are tied to 
base salaries and recruitment and retention schemes.  For companies, the human resources principle 
can be used to justify paying executives above the median relative to peers.  The agency, motivation 
and pay-for-performance principles are tied to short- and long-term incentive schemes.  However, it 
is not often this straightforward.   Code issuers and companies use each of the remuneration 
principles to justify many different executive remuneration practices.  This illustrates the flexibility 
of the remuneration principles.  First, the remuneration principles are difficult to dispute.  Second, 
the remuneration principles are also open to interpretation.  Notably, code issuers contribute to this 
flexibility because their recommendations are principle-based, non-specific and often unrestrictive 
with respect to executive remuneration practices. 
 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are deeply embedded in this discourse on executive 
remuneration.  Both Logics provide a common thread that ties executive remuneration principles 
and practices inextricably together.  This is an intriguing finding because Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic have opposing assumptions about how executives should behave.  It appears that 
competitive and institutional pressures have compelled companies to adopt executive remuneration 
practices that are consistent with both Logics.  Further, the institutional identity of non-executive 
directors compels them to adopt these practices, and they manage tensions by prioritising the 
remuneration principles.  However, directors, code issuers, investors and others are urged to 
reconsider their beliefs and take a simpler approach to executive remuneration.  A simpler approach 
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does not constitute a silver bullet or the Holy Grail, but it is more transparent and its motivational 
effects are no worse than current practices.  
 
Further official inquiries in the vein of the UK’s Greenbury (1995) report are necessary in order to 
illuminate the difficulties boards and remuneration committees experience in making and reporting 
remuneration decisions.  Code issuers should reconsider their support for the human 
resources/market principles because of the ratchet effect.  It seems unreasonable to expect all 
companies to pay competitively because, by definition, some executives must be below average.  
Similarly, they should reconsider their support for the agency/pay-for-performance principles.  The 
empirical evidence is unequivocal: Companies that adopt performance-based remuneration do not 
necessarily maximise shareholder value (Rost and Osterloh, 2009; Tosi et al., 2000; Devers et al., 
2007).  Finally, code issuers should be careful in how they phrase their recommendations in order to 
avoid boilerplate language (e.g. “attract, motivate and retain”) being propagated.   
 
Directors and executives should reconsider their beliefs.  Drawing on the sampled corporate annual 
reports, it appears that directors believe that the executives they hired were stronger performers, 
deserving of remuneration that was set at the median or higher relative to their peers.  This line of 
reasoning could result in a ratchet effect.  An alternative explanation is that the sampled companies 
had outperformed their competitors, explaining why they recommended above-average 
remuneration, but this is unlikely.  Thus, directors should reconsider their beliefs and the executive 
remuneration practices that they currently use.   
 
Executives are portrayed in both codes and corporate annual reports as being capable of maximising 
shareholder value, but only if they are coerced by short- and long-term incentive schemes.  
However, it is likely that executives are motivated by a range of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.  
Performance-based remuneration is the only or best means of motivating executives.  Thus, 
executives should reconsider their beliefs and, if they do not already, discuss with their boards what 
motivates them.  Perhaps, executives should reject some components of their remuneration 
packages that cannot realistically have any effect on their behaviour.  
 
When studying recent trends in the diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, there are at 
least three opportunities for future research.  First, how AU and UK companies change their 
discourse on executive remuneration following a large negative shareholder vote on their 
remuneration report should be studied.  Such research would generate insight into how competitive 
and institutional pressures influence companies and how they respond to these pressures.  Second, 
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trends in companies’ desired and actual mix of fixed and variable remuneration should be tracked.  
This will show how support for Corporate Logic and Investor Logic waxes and wanes over time.  
Third, companies’ corporate objectives and performance measures should be studied.  The 
discourse analysis hinted that some companies had a mismatch because their mission statements 
and performance measures (not reported in the findings section).  This would build on Fiss and 
Zajac’s (2004; 2006) and Zajac and Westphal’s (1995; 2004) research on the symbolic and 
substantive nature of institutional logics.   
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B. Corporate Annual Reports 
B.1. United Kingdom 
Companies 1989 1998 2007 
Antofagasta    
Associated British Foods    
British America Tobacco    
Cadbury    
Legal and General Group    
Pearson    
Sainsbury J    
Standard Chartered    
Tesco    
Unilever    
Xtrata    
 
B.2. Australia 
Companies 1989 1998 2007 
Bluescope Steel*    
Brambles    
Newcrest Mining    
Qantas    
QBE Insurance    
Telstra Corporation    
Toll Holdings    
Westfield Holdings    
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Westpac Banking Corporation    
 
* Note: Bluescope Steel was part of The Broken Hill Proprietary Company (BHP) in 1998. Thus, 
the 1998 annual report is BHP’s. 
 
B.3. New Zealand 
Companies 1989 1998 2007 
Air New Zealand    
BIL International    
EBOS Group    
Fisher and Paykel Healthcare**    
Guinness Peat Group    
Hellaby Holdings    
Michael Hill International    
Property for Industry    
Sky Network    
Steel and Tube    
Telecom Corporation of N.Z.    
The Warehouse    
Tourism Holdings    
 
** Note: Fisher & Paykel Healthcare was part of Fisher & Paykel Industries in 1998. Thus, the 
1998 annual report is Fisher & Paykel Industries’. 
  
